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 The political economy of Baltic States’ accession into the EU:  
The impact on the role of the state
φ 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
                                                          
After a decade and a half of transition reforms, many analysts agree that the transition in 
the Baltic States like in other Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) is coming 
to its completion with the sustainable democratic institutions and conditions for a market 
economy in place and membership in the European Union (EU). Of course, there are 
areas in most CEECs such as railways or energy, agriculture, pension system, health and 
education, or governance structures – which are still in the process of structural reforms 
(as in some of the incumbent EU members like Germany). Moreover, transition in those 
countries “from plan to market” has gradually turned into a permanent transition 
reflecting shifts in global markets and changing modes of governance in most countries 
of the world
1. However, by now it is already possible to analyze the main outcomes of 
transition reforms and changing role of the state (or the size and scope of government), 
even though it should be acknowledged that changes in informal structures – values and 
patterns of social behavior – will take much longer than formal systemic reforms.  
 
The process of integration into the EU has been the major factor which has 
increasingly impacted on the transition reforms and their outcomes in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The impact of the EU on reforms in CEECs has been first acknowledged by the 
analysts of transition, mainly by focusing on the aid and trade policies of the Union
2. The 
role of the EU as a model to be imitated, as a supplier of a framework for external 
economic policies, and, later, of templates for domestic policies, has been increasingly 
recognized by the analysts of European integration and some scholars of transition 
reforms
3.  
 
φ The paper was presented at the conference on European Union enlargement, Miami, April 22, 
2005. Its earlier versions have been discussed at the NOPSA conference of 2002 and the seminar at the 
Maxwell School of Syracuse university. 
1 For an example of broader discussion of changing role of the state see World Development 
Report, The State in a Changing World, Washington, D. C., The World Bank, 1997. 
 
2 See Lavigne, M. The Economics of Transition. From Socialist to Market Economy, New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1999. 
 
3 See for example, Grabbe, H. How Does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance? 
Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity, in Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 8, issue 4, p. 1013-1031 
(December 2001); Vachudova, M. A. The Leverage of International Institutions on Democratizing States: 
Eastern Europe and European Union, Manuscript under Review at International Organizations, 2002; 
Orlowski, W., Mayhew, A. The impact of EU accession on enterprise adaptation and institutional 
development in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Sussex: Sussex European Institute, SEI 
Working paper No. 44, p. 1-76; Orenstein, M. A. Out of the Red. Building Capitalism and Democracy in 
Postcommunist Europe, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2001; also a collection of papers 
from the ECPR Joint sessions of workshops in Turin, 22-27 March, 2002; some contributions to the Special 
  1However, most of the studies focusing on the impact of the EU on political 
structures, policy content and outcomes in the CEECs remain fragmented and policy or 
issue specific focusing on the impact of the EU on concrete policy areas or institutional 
structures
4. As one of the relatively recent and most significant contributions to the 
analysis of the most recent EU enlargement suggested, “there is little cross-fertilization 
between theoretical studies of the impact of international organizations, the 
Europeanization literature, the more theoretical literature on the transformations in the 
CEECs and the mainly descriptive literature on the effect of the EU on the candidates 
which is often limited to single countries and single policy areas.”
5 This description of 
the state of academic affairs in the field is still accurate a couple of years ago. 
 
This paper aims at providing a broad analysis of the EU’s impact on the CEECs 
which is not sector or policy specific by focusing on the changing role of the  state in 
these countries as a result of direct and indirect impact of the EU. It draws on the 
concepts developed by the Europeanization studies, debates on the regulation in EU and 
in particular studies of transition reforms. The studies of the two processes of transition 
and EU accession, in particular the character and outcomes of their interaction, have for a 
long time been fragmented and divided into two separate fields. Some analysts go as far 
as to claim that, “the two not only pass each other as ships in the night, but rarely even 
sail in the same sea.”
6 This paper starts with the premise that integrating the results of 
studies from the transition reforms and EU accession policies can provide new insights 
about the changing role of the state, boundaries between private and public, and potential 
implications for the success of public policies in the CEECs and growth of their 
economies. 
 
In addition, the paper also critically examines the prevailing arguments 
concerning the character of EU’s impact on CEECs and provides a different perspective 
on the issue. Although the literature on the impact of the EU on the redrawing of 
boundaries between market and the state so far has been rather limited, there have been 
several arguments which are made explicitly by the authors or are tacitly accepted as the 
conventional wisdom in policy specific analysis.  
The first argument, which is particularly clearly expressed in the literature using 
neo-Marxist approaches to the study of EU policies towards CEECs, is that the impact of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Issue on the Enlarged European Union of West European Politics, vol. 25, no. 2, April 2002, edited by 
Mair, P., Zielonka, J.; and some contributions to the Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 9, No. 4, 
August 2002. 
 
4 Rare exceptions include Grabbe, H. European Integration and Corporate Governance in Central 
Europe: Trajectories of Institutional Change, in Federowicz, M, Vitols, S. (eds.) Corporate Governance in a 
Changing Economic and Political Environment: Trajectories of Institutional Change on the European 
Continent, Berlin: Sigma/Wisseschaftszentrum Berlin, 2002; Maniokas, K. EU Enlargement and 
Europeanization: When a patchwork becomes a blueprint, Draft PhD dissertation, June 2002. 
 
5 Schimmelfenning, F., Sedelmeier, U. Theorizing EU enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, 
and the state of research, in Journal of European Public Policy, 9:4, August 2002, p. 507. 
 
6 Dimitrova, A. L. (2002) Enlargement Governance and Institution Building in Central and astern 
Europe: The case of the European Union’s administrative capacity requirement, Draft paper, p. 4. 
  2the EU on the CEECs could be best described as an exercise of neo-liberal restructuring.
7  
In other words, the influence of the EU has contributed to the shrinking of the state in 
CEECs, or is sometimes even characterized as an “export of a market radical variant of 
neo-liberalism.”
8  
 
The other increasingly accepted argument in the literature on EU accession is 
about the strengthening of the regulatory role of the state in CEECs.
9 This is not 
surprising taking into account that one of the main criteria for joining the EU is the 
adoption of its acquis communautaire – about 80000 pages of legislation which governs 
(and extends beyond) the cross-border transactions of EU’s internal market. However, 
most analysts do not address the implications of expanding the regulatory functions of the 
state in CEECs, neither examine this trend in relation with changes in other functions of 
the state or place the debate in the context of more general debates on deregulation and 
re-regulation that have been taking place in the EU or OECD countries.
10 
 
In addition to filling some of the existing analytical voids, this paper argues that 
the description of the EU’s impact on CEECs as a “neo-liberal restructuring” is 
incomplete and misleading. While the focus on trajectories of expanding the regulatory 
functions of the state and importing “regulatory state” from the EU provides a more 
accurate description of the process, it still remains incomplete. This paper introduces a 
number of qualifications to these arguments showing that the influence of the EU has 
been causing divergent and sometimes contradictory outcomes.  
 
In terms of its impact on the role of state it has been (1) encouraging the shrinking 
of certain functions (in particular by direct and indirect influence of liberalizing external 
transactions, privatization, de-monopolization and, to some extent, restriction of room for 
stabilization policies) while (2) contributing to the expansion of others (in particular, 
regulatory function and public investments), (3) with the unintended consequences, 
                                                           
 
7 See Bieler, A. The struggle over EU enlargement: a historical materialist analysis of European 
integration, in Journal of European Public Policy, 9:4, August 2002, p. 575-597; Bohle, D. The ties that 
bind the new Europe: neoliberal restructuring and transnational actors in the deepening and widening of the 
European Union, Draft paper presented at Workshop 4 “Enlargement and European Governance”, ECPR 
Joint Session Workshops, Turin, 22-27 March 2002. 
 
8 Bohle, D. p. 35. 
9 See for example, Grabbe, H. 2002; Maniokas, K. 2002; Mayhew, A. Preparing for accession: 
problems for the associated countries, in Mayhew, A. Recreating Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, p. 200-235. For a detailed analysis of the impact of adopting EU regulations on the 
economy of a candidate country see Vilpišauskas, R. The Regulatory Alignment in the Context of EU 
Accession and its Impact on the Functioning of Lithuanian Economy, in Revenga, A. (ed.) Lithuania: 
Country Economic Memorandum: Volume II: Technical Papers, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2002, p. 
205-246. 
 
10 The most well known examples of writings on the regulatory reform in Western Europe and 
USA include the works of G. Majone (for example, Majone, G. (ed.) Regulating Europe, London: 
Routledge, 1996), also Vogel, S. Freer markets, more rules: regulatory reform in advanced industrial 
countries, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996; Midttun, A. Svindland, E. (eds.) Approaches and 
Dilemmas in Economic Regulation, New York: Palgrave, 2001. 
  3mostly because of the lack of EU competence in these areas and therefore shortage of 
attention and resources, of relatively neglecting others (the enforcement of property 
rights, internal order and security, reforms of welfare functions - health, social security 
and education). Therefore, the term “weaker guardianship, less direct participation in the 
economy, status quo in welfare promotion and more regulation” rather than the 
promotion of straightforward “neo-liberal” policies describes better the impact of the 
EU.
11 
 
The paper is structured by discussing first the roles of the state in general and in 
transition countries, the sources and instruments of EU influence on the role of state in 
the new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe and presenting a number of 
tentative conclusions about the EU’s impact. Most empirical evidence is based on the 
observations drawn from the Baltic States. This choice is based on several motives. First, 
at the outset of transition reforms the Baltic States faced the need to create institutional 
structures which have been lacking due to their incorporation into the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, the impact of the EU could arguably be more evident in the case of the Baltic 
States as compared to the Visegrad countries which at least formally had their own 
institutions during the Soviet period. Second, although being similar in size, recent 
historical record, policy objectives and similar policy of the EU towards them, the three 
Baltic countries have chosen somewhat different paths of transition reforms. Third, the 
research on policy reforms in the Baltic States is still scarce in comparison to the 
Visegrad countries, which are most often chosen as case studies addressing the impact of 
the EU on transition countries and its new members
12.  
 
The dependent variable in this paper is the role of the state while the independent 
variable is the influence of the EU mediated by domestic factors such as state-society 
relations and institutional structures in the context of rapid change and uncertainty which 
come into play both at the stage of policy decisions and their implementation. Often the 
impact of the EU is difficult to differentiate from the general influence of globalization 
(exogenous) or the role of domestic (endogenous) factors. However, a number of 
observations could be made with a satisfactory degree of certainty to draw a broad picture 
of the patterns of EU influence on the role of state in candidate CEECs and point to 
further venues for research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
11 Though the extent of convergence toward these roles in each transition country has been 
dependent on domestic political economy factors and previous decisions made at the outset of transition 
reforms. 
 
12 Among the recent studies of Central European EU members see Vachudova. M. Europe 
Undivided. Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005. 
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The proper role of the state has been probably one of the most debated issues in the 
political economy literature for a number of centuries. The problem of demarcation 
concerning the proper size of the public vis-à-vis private is an issue of contention not 
only between supporters of two types of organization of economic activities - market and 
planning economy, but also between proponents of different roles of the state in the 
market economy.
13 The distinction between public and private has many aspects 
including free exchange and authority, competition and hierarchy, laissez-faire and 
planning, etc. while different typologies of roles usually imply both positive and 
prescriptive conclusions concerning functions of the state.
14 Some of them used in public 
finance theory refer to technical and economic properties of goods (usually dealing with 
issues of information and incentives), some are based on the argument of popular 
preferences. These debates tend to reflect different values, political economy factors and 
different dominant paradigms which change in time and constantly redraw the boundaries 
between public and private in each society. 
 
It is not in the scope of this paper to discuss the arguments used to justify smaller or 
larger role of the state. The concept of the role of the state is important in providing an 
instrument that could be used to trace the trajectories of EU influence on transition 
reforms and their outcomes and to evaluate their potential implications. In other words, 
the purpose is to present a positive analysis with some tentative normative conclusions. 
The paper uses the metaphors of state which reflect different functions assigned to it (or 
rather different emphasis):  
 
(1)  The guardian (minimal) state which represents a metaphor for the functions of 
law and order enforcement (or protection of property rights and enforcement of 
contracts); 
(2)  The stabilizer state which stands for a metaphor of monetary and fiscal measures 
aimed at  reducing unemployment and inflation;  
(3)  The welfare state which represents the redistributive and paternalistic functions, 
most often based on the arguments of social justice and merit; 
(4)  The regulatory state which influences the private actors by enforcing compulsory 
rules based on the perceived need to correct “market failures” (monopoly power, 
information asymmetries, and negative externalities). 
 
These categories are not exclusive (some of them overlap in their effects, for 
example, regulations have redistributive effects as well, or their conceptual basis), nor 
they are exhaustive.
15 They do not imply that equally balanced assignment of all of these 
                                                           
 
13 See Lane, J.-E. The Public Sector. Concepts. Models and Approaches, London: Sage, 2000. 
 
14 As the World Bank Report maintains, the unique aspects of the state are its powers to tax, to 
prohibit, to punish, and to require participation. The World Bank, World Development Report 1997, The 
State in a changing world, Washington, D. C., World Bank, 1997, p. 25.  
 
  5functions is an objective desirable in itself, though it could be hypothesized that the 
successful enforcement of protection of property rights and contracts is the necessary 
prerequisite for the functioning of markets and growth of welfare.
16 Rather, they 
represent a collection of paradigms each of which dominated or coexisted at some point 
of history. Moreover, often public and private spheres coexist in fulfilling similar 
functions, or the expansion of private sphere is paralleled by the strengthening of 
government’s role through different means. For example, different regulatory measures 
are implemented by self-regulation in addition to rules set by the national or 
supranational government. The privatization of enterprises is often followed by a more 
intense regulation of their activities. Removal of regulatory differences between the 
member states in the Single Market is paralleled by the re-regulation, i.e. setting EU wide 
common standards. 
 
These categories are further used to analyze the influence of the EU on transition 
reforms. Importantly, the constraints and opportunities set by the EU for the 
implementation of any of these functions is likely to have significant political and 
economic implications for the new members. 
 
Changing role of the state in the Baltic countries 
 
The understanding of the role of the state at the outset of the reforms was rather 
straightforward – transition from statist, control and planning based economies to market 
economies meant reducing radically the scope and size of government activities. The 
political economy dilemmas facing reformers in transition countries was the downsizing 
of their own apparatus thereby limiting their power (tying their own hands) and by 
conducting reforms to create enough winners as to ensure the continuity of newly 
introduced arrangement and not to create political obstacles for further reforms. While 
the political support for reforms has been relatively high at the end of 1980s and the start 
of 1990s in the Baltic states where transition reforms have been identified with the 
reestablishment of independence, later the popular support went down. The accession 
into the EU has played a role of additional legitimizing factor (although this role should 
not be overemphasized). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
15 Some authors suggest slightly different categorizations. For example, one of still widely used 
classification of state functions of influencing allocation of goods, redistribution and stabilization has been 
suggested several decades ago by Musgrave. Others maintain that governments carry out three categories of 
economic activities - regulation to create and amend property rights, price setting directly or through taxes 
and subsidies, and production of different (public) goods like education, defense or health care (see 
Connolly, S. Munro, A. Economics of the Public Sector, London, Prentice Hall, 1999). Still other 
categorization is suggested by the World Bank defining the roles of the state along two axes of addressing 
market failures and improving equity on one, and fulfilling minimal, intermediate and activist functions on 
the other (see the World Bank Report 1997). 
 
16 The actual exercise of a certain functional measure of the state might simply be a result of a 
political decision not based on any coherent criteria (for example, a reward of a narrow interest group by 
redistributive means), or might result from a misinformed decision (for example, attempting to correct a 
“market failure” by unintentionally creating a larger “government failure”). 
  6The debates at the start of economic reforms have concerned mainly the speed 
and sequence of reforms.
17 Later, with the “normalization” of politics they moved to the 
familiar debates about the proper role of the state in a market economy (for example, by 
bringing into the debate the currently fashionable emphasis on the role of properly 
designed institutions to support functioning of the markets – so called Post-Washington 
consensus).
18 The influence of the EU has also been transforming from generally 
supportive of the reduction of the role of the state to changing the functional nature and 
scope of state activities, and in some cases even reversing the trajectories of transition 
reforms (by increasing the state interventions into the economy or setting the limits to its 
further reduction). The latter changes differed in every of the Baltic states (and between 
them and other transition countries) depending on the previous transition policy 
decisions. 
 
The role of state has been reduced significantly during the transition reforms, 
mostly during the period of 1990-1995. In particular, its role in price setting and direct 
ownership of factors of production has been restricted through the liberalization of 
external transactions, reduction of price controls, reduction of subsidies, other obstacles 
to competition, privatization of enterprises and restitution (though not so much 
enforcement) of property rights.  
 
The stabilization function, which played a particularly important role at the outset 
of reforms, was subsequently implemented by restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. 
This is especially evident in the Baltic states with Estonia and Lithuania establishing 
currency boards and in the second half of 1990s (in particular after the financial crisis in 
Russia in August 1998) pursuing restricted budgetary policies. This had a positive impact 
on stabilization of macroeconomic environment and resulting fastest in Europe economic 
growth and contributed significantly to these two countries meeting all convergence 
(Maastricht) criteria in 2004. Both Estonia and Lithuania were among the first three new 
members of the EU to join the Exchange rate mechanism II in mid-2004, followed in 
Spring 2005 by Latvia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
 
17 See, for example, the World Development Report, From Plan to Market, Washington, D. C., 
The World Bank, 1996. 
 
18 See Kolodko, G. W. Ten Years of Postsocialist Transition: the Lessons for Policy Reforms, 
Washington D. C.,  World Bank Development Research Group, Research paper, 1998; Ahrens J., Meurers, 
“Institutions, Governance, and Economic Performance in Post-Socialist Countries: A conceptual and Empirical 
Approach”, 2000, http://www.sigov.si/zmar/conference2000/pdf/meurers.pdf. 
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Table 1. The Baltic states and Poland with respect to meeting Maastricht criteria 
   Criteria  Lithuania  Latvia  Estonia  Poland 
Inflation, 2004 
(yearly average)  2,2%*  1,1  6,2  3,0  3,6 
Public sector 
balance, 2004 (% of 
GDP) 
<= 3%  -2,5  -0,8  1,8  -4,8 
State debt, 2004 (% 
of GDP) 
<= 60%  19,7  14,4  4,9  43,6 
Long-term interest 
rates, March 2004- 
February 2005 
6,2%*  4,34  4,71  4,34  6,75 
Stability of national 
currency with 
respect to euro, 
Februaty 2003-
January 2005 
15% limit  Fixed  
Fixed with 
1 % 
margin for 
fluctuation
fixed  12,2 
Source: SEB Vilniaus bankas 
 
The reform of the state apparatus – public administration and suppliers of public 
services – has proceeded slower than economic restructuring, thereby constantly 
producing coordination problems during the implementation of reforms and slowing 
down further development of the markets in the fields such as education and health care. 
The regulatory functions remained rather extensive, and it is in this area as well as public 
administration where the past legacies (“path dependencies”) have been most noticeably 
felt. The actual tendencies in regulatory framework represented an incremental muddling 
through the regulatory structures inherited from the previous system and adding new ones 
rather than consistent deregulation of the transition economies.
19 
 
It should be noted, though, that even when agreement concerning the reform 
objectives to be achieved existed, the actual implementation of these policy measures has 
been uneven and often inconsistent due to political economy factors such as uncertainty 
concerning the instruments, lack of experience, coordination problems, interest group 
pressure and financial constraints. The influence of the EU extended not only to setting 
limits or creating new roles for the state, but also in structuring the process of actual 
policy implementation (effectiveness of governance) by creating new incentives and 
constraints (for example, creating mechanisms of control to monitor the use of EU 
funds). 
                                                           
19 The over-regulation of the economy, in particular in the areas of access to land and labor, tax 
administration and movement of goods, which complicate set up and functioning of small and medium 
enterprises in Lithuania has been noted by different observers. See for example, FIAS, Lithuania. 
Administrative Barriers, FIAS, IFC and World Bank, July 1999. 
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The progress in reforms and shifting boundaries between public and private 
spheres can be illustrated by indexes of transition and economic freedom which are 
compiled regularly by institutions such as the EBRD, the Heritage Foundation and Wall 
Street Journal, the Freedom House and the Fraser Institute.  
 
These evaluations illustrate that by now a major share of GDP is produced in the 
private sector. Small business privatization and trade and foreign exchange liberalization 
are typical of the advanced industrial economies. It should be noted that the current 
degree of liberalization in the Baltic States had been achieved about eight years ago. Less 
progress is made in governance reforms, functioning of non banking institutions, reforms 
of infrastructure, including regulation of utilities prices. Also, it should be noted that 
before the accession into the EU, the share of resources redistributed through the budget 
has been relatively low in the Baltic states comparable only to Ireland’s.  
 
Figure 1. Overall fiscal expenditures as % of GDP   
30
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2001 2002 2003
 
Source: Eurostat, cited in the World Bank (2004) 
 
 
Several observations can be made from these evaluations. First, the Baltic States 
progressed most in liberalization of foreign trade which exceeds comparable indicators of 
most advanced economies. Second, the fiscal burden of government equals respective 
indicators of EU member states, often being lower if calculated as a share of GDP. Third, 
the least progress is reported in protecting property rights and regulatory environment. It 
could be noted, that although all three countries fall into the category of “mostly free 
countries” in most rankings of transition indexes Estonia is evaluated slightly more 
favorably than Latvia and Lithuania which tends to correlate with economic indicators 
such as GDP growth and per capita incomes. Estonia was also the only Baltic State to 
join the Luxembourg group of accession countries that started negotiations with the EU 
in 1998, with Latvia and Lithuania joining in the second wave in 2000 (though political 
  9factors also played a role in this process of selection). By the date of accession into the 
EU and a year from then all three Baltic States have shown similar economic 
performance, though diverging on some indicators. 
The sources and instruments of EU impact  
 
The importance of the EU and its potential to influence transition reforms in the Baltic 
States originated from several factors.  
 
First, it was the willingness of these countries’ governments to open up to the EU 
influence which was related to both a broad desire “to return to Europe” and a concrete 
foreign policy objective to join the EU. The desire to become members of the EU which 
was particularly strengthened by the Copenhagen EU Summit decisions, in 1993, resulted 
in the adoption of increasingly concrete policy measures, shaping the role of the state in 
the candidate countries. 
 
Second, the potential of the EU to exert influence on candidate countries resulted 
from the asymmetrical nature of EU-accession country relationship. The governments in 
the latter expected to reap significant benefits from the accession, while policy makers in 
the EU were relatively cautious about the enlargement due to relatively less significant 
potential economic impact on the current members as compared with the candidate 
countries. The chosen method of enlargement when the candidates have to adjust to all 
existing EU norms (not only extensive acquis communautaire, but also additional 
membership criteria introduced by the Copenhagen Summit and detailed later by the 
Commission) also increased the potential influence of the EU, represented by the 
European Commission.
20 
 
Third, the uncertainty about the conduct of reforms due to their complexity and 
the lack of expertise significantly strengthened the willingness of policy makers in the 
Baltic countries to recreate policy models of the Western countries and adopt the explicit 
prescriptions of external advisors (usually linked with financial assistance). This has 
resulted in unilateral, or so called “anticipatory adaptation” of regimes governing 
economic relations of industrialized democratic countries which was at the basis of 
transition to market economy and democratic governance.
21  It formed a part of the 
learning and imitation process of the policy makers in transition countries. This process 
of adaptation to a large extent has been taking place irrespective of external demands.
22 
 
                                                           
20 On this point see Grabbe, H. How Does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance? 
Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity, in Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 8, issue 4, p. 1013-1031 
(December 2001). 
 
21 Nicolaidis, K. East European Trade in the Aftermath of 1989: Did International Institutions 
Matter? in Keohane, R. O., Nye, J. S., Hoffman, S. (eds.) After the Cold War. International Institutions and 
State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. 
 
22 It has often resulted in a mixture of “positive reference models” both from the external 
environment and from the past. For example, inter-war cooperative experiences have often been referred to 
in the discussion on the models of trilateral Baltic cooperation. 
 10Assistance measures and trade agreements. From the start of transition reforms, 
the most important initial policy measures of the EU towards CEECs consisted of 
financial assistance program Phare as well as coordination  of other international 
assistance measures, and first (Trade, commercial and economic cooperation) and second 
generation (Europe or association)  agreements. The Phare program throughout the first 
half of the 1990s targeted economic restructuring (privatization, infrastructure, financial 
sector, agriculture, etc.) and other reform measures (for example, later introduced 
measures of support for democratic institutions). However, more significant economic 
impact has been made by trade liberalization measures which reduced substantially for 
trade between the EU and CEECs. 
 
The EC recognized the independence of the three Baltic States in August 27, 
1991, and already EC representatives suggested including the three states into the Phare 
program, thereby differentiating them from the other former Soviet Union republics.
23 
The preparation to sign trade and cooperation agreements similar to those concluded with 
CEECs were also started. The agreements were signed in May 1992 and came into force 
in the first months of 1993. 
 
Table 2. The main bilateral economic agreements between the Baltic States and the 
EU 
Agreement 
Signed  In force  Main provisions 
Trade and 
Cooperation 
Agreements 
11.05.9
2 
01.02.93 
(for Latvia, 
Lithuania) 
01.03.93 (for 
Estonia) 
 
Most favorite nation status, non-discrimination; extension of EU 
generalized system of preferences; economic cooperation in some areas  
Agreements on 
Free Trade and 
Trade related 
matters 
18.07.9
4 
01.01.95  Liberalization of trade based on GATT principles; free trade in industrial 
goods (CN 25-97); 4 years transition period of gradual liberalization 
given to Latvia, 6 years transition period of gradual liberalization given 
to Lithuania; standard protection clauses; Joint committees to oversee the 
implementation of the agreements 
Association 
(Europe) 
Agreements 
12.06.9
5 
01.02.98  Objectives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to become EU members 
acknowledged; the provisions of free trade agreement incorporated; 
political dialogue; economic cooperation in areas such as competition 
policy (EU rules), movement of services, capital and labor, 
establishment, protection of intellectual property rights, consumer 
protection, approximation of laws, cooperation in other areas such as 
industrial policy, science and technology, energy, environment, etc.; 
Association Council to supervise the implementation of the agreement 
and Association Committee 
Source: respective bilateral agreements 
 
Signing of the Free trade agreements between the EU and the Baltic States in 
1994 contributed significantly to the removal of barriers to trade between those countries 
                                                           
 
23 For example, during the period of 1995-1999, the Phare allocations to the Baltic states totaled 
143 million Ecu for Estonia, 186 million Ecu for Latvia and 232 million Ecu for Lithuania.  
 11and the EU and restructuring of economic activities in these countries. The increasing 
flows of trade with the EU currently accounting for around 50-70 percent of these 
countries’ foreign trade turnover have resulted to a significant degree from trade 
liberalization measures. The agreements have also been important in several other 
respects. By “locking in” the level of liberalization achieved they were prevented from 
returning to more protectionist policies after the “normalization” of domestic politics and 
resurgence of interest groups activities.
24  
 
Moreover, there is ample evidence to argue that these agreements, together with 
the incentives of perspective EU membership and co-ordinatory role of the EU, proved to 
be the major factor behind other free trade agreements concluded by the Baltic States.
25 
These include several free trade agreements liberalizing completely trade between the 
three as well as free trade agreements liberalizing trade in industrial products between the 
Baltic States and members of Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) which 
itself was a product of joint integrative measures of CEFTA countries into the EU. The 
fact that around 70-80 percent of trade of the Baltic States is now conducted with the 
other EU members and countries with which EU has free trade agreements is a result of 
EU policies. 
 
However, the actual influence of the EU on liberalization of external transactions 
in the Baltic States should not be overestimated. First, in the case of Estonia the free trade 
agreement with the EU did not result in any changes of country’s external trade policy 
since after the trade regime reforms in 1992-1993 all trade restrictions have been 
removed unilaterally. Second, trade liberalization with Latvia and Lithuania has been 
gradual reflecting the influence of domestic interest groups. Third, the EU itself did not 
liberalize trade completely, leaving in place tariff barriers to trade in agricultural products 
and possibilities to use commercial protection instruments which have later been used in 
the form of antidumping duties and will be removed completely only after the accession. 
These measures added legitimacy to the use of similar protection instruments by the 
candidate countries (except Estonia due to its particularly liberal trade policy). 
 
Membership criteria, pre-accession process and adoption of acquis 
communautaire. The influence of the EU on the transition reforms in the Baltic States has 
been strengthened after the EU recognized their candidate country status and included 
them into the pre-accession strategy consisting of Phare, Europe agreements (though in 
the case of the Baltic states they came into force only several years later) and the White 
paper on integration into the internal market presented by the Commission in 1995. In 
other words, the Baltic States were provided with the opportunity to further integrate their 
markets into the EU, participate in the Council meetings together with other CEECs, and 
                                                           
24 For the evidence of this argument in the case of CEFTA countries see Kaminski, B. The EU 
Factor in Trade Policies of Central European Countries, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, November 
1999. 
 
25 For a detailed analysis of links between EU policies towards the Baltic states and the economic 
cooperation measures between those three states see Vilpišauskas, R. Regional integration in Europe: 
analyzing intra-Baltic economic co-operation”, Florence, European University Institute, Robert Schuman 
Centre, Working paper No. 41, 2000. 
 12to focus on adopting EU’s legal rules governing the internal market. In the latter case, the 
Commission has suggested that each country should draw up its own timetable of legal 
approximation. This move strengthened the influence of the EU on reforms and public 
policies in the Baltic States and provided instruments to structure their efforts aimed at 
preparations for the accession.  
 
The pre-accession strategy followed from the well known Copenhagen criteria of 
EU membership declared in 1993 representing an innovative measure in comparison to 
the previous EU enlargements. These membership criteria included (1) stable institutions 
(guarantee of democracy, rule of law, human rights, minority rights), (2) functioning 
market economy, (3) capacity to cope with competitive pressures inside the EU, and (4) 
ability to adopt the acquis and accept the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
Later more conditions were added, for example, the requirement for administrative 
capacity added in Madrid Council of 1995, conditions concerning specific issues such as 
nuclear safety have been set, and those same Copenhagen criteria have been gradually 
made more concrete. As it has been noted, the conditions set by the Copenhagen Summit, 
namely the first political and economic criteria, go beyond those for any previous 
applicant which provides an opportunity for the EU to involve itself in domestic policy 
making of the candidate CEECs to a degree unprecedented in the current member 
states.
26 It was the adoption of policy measures aimed at meeting the economic criteria of 
“a functioning market economy” and transposition of the acquis which contributed most 
to the changing role of the state in the Baltic countries. 
 
Although the general phrasing of membership criteria initially caused uncertainty 
and speculations, they have been gradually given more concrete expression by the 
European Commission. The efforts of candidate CEECs aimed at meeting the 
membership obligations criteria have been since 1995 directed by the White book setting 
regulatory norms governing EU internal market to be adopted. The acquis was presented 
on the basis of 23 sections and included areas such as free movement of goods, services, 
capital and people, competition, telecommunications, audiovisual services, transport, 
customs, social, environmental and other measures. The White book detailed the EU 
legal norms to be implemented and regulatory structures to be set up by the candidate 
countries and represented an unprecedented exercise of re-regulation on the part of 
transition countries. The extent of this exercise has been discussed elsewhere, though it 
should be noted that the main factors which complicated the regulatory efforts of the 
transition countries included more extensive than during previous enlargements acquis of 
the EU and lower starting positions of the transition countries in terms of economic 
development and administrative capacity.
27 
 
                                                           
26 Grabbe, H. Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accesison Process, 
chapter to appear in Featherstone, K. Radaelli, C. (eds.) The Politics of Europeanisation, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, Second Draft, 2002, p. 5. 
 
27 See Vilpišauskas, R. The Regulatory Alignment in the Context of EU Accession and its Impact 
on the Functioning of Lithuanian Economy, in Lithuania: Country Economic Memorandum: Volume II: 
Technical Papers, Revenga, A. (ed.) Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2002, p. 205-246. 
 13Accession negotiations and monitoring of progress in meeting membership 
criteria. The political and economic criteria have been made more concrete first in the 
Agenda 2000 produced by the Commission in 1997.
28 Many conditions detailed under 
these criteria had a direct connection with the role of the state in the candidate countries. 
For example, the need to liberalize trade was emphasized once again. The importance of 
macroeconomic stability and protection of property rights and contracts was underlined. 
Later these conditions have been regularly reviewed by the Commission in the context of 
preparations for accession. The first Accession Partnerships were decided in March 1998 
for each candidate CEECs and later revised twice in 1999 and 2001 on the basis of 
Progress Reports and consultation with national authorities.  
 
The Accession Partnerships represent the most advanced form of policy advice 
provided by the EU to the candidate countries by distinguishing the categories of 
measures in terms of their urgency and by directly linking the financial means and 
progress in negotiations with the progress of the implementation of suggested measures. 
The recommendations of the Commission, set in the Accession Partnerships on the basis 
of the issues identified by the Progress Reports, have been mirrored in the National 
Programs for the Adoption of Acquis of each candidate country. The NAPPs have 
become the main instrument of managing the complex process of regulatory alignment in 
the candidate countries by setting the timetable of legislative approximation measures, 
setting up administrative structures and financing those measures. The accession 
negotiations conducted on the basis of 31 chapters covering all EU acquis also illustrate 
the complexity of the adjustment process which took place in the Baltics. 
 
It has been noted that “the EU’s most powerful conditionality tool is access to 
different stages in the accession process, particularly achieving candidate status and 
starting negotiations.”
29 The gate keeping role of the Commission has been especially 
evident since the start of accession negotiations through the linkages of closing 
negotiation chapters with concrete policy measures to be undertaken by candidate 
countries (for example, in the case of Lithuania the chapter of Telecommunications and 
IT has been closed only after the independent regulatory agency was established, the 
Energy chapter was closed after the commitment on decommission the second reactor of 
Ignalina Nuclear power Plan by 2010 was received from the government).  
 
Finally, the influence of the EU has been also increasing due to a wider use of 
different policy advice measures, extending beyond the competence of the EU in its older 
member states. The benchmarking and policy advice on the issues such as employment 
strategies, administrative capacities or pressure on the issues grouped under the criteria of 
“the functioning market economy” such as pension reforms and land reform allowed 
exerting additional influence on public policies and transition reforms in candidate 
countries. It seems very likely that the experienced accumulated during the enlargement 
                                                           
 
28 European Commission, Agenda 2000. For a Stronger and Wider Union, Bulletin of the 
European Union, Supplement 5/97, 1997.  
 
29 Grabbe, H. How Does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and 
Diversity, in Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 8, issue 4, p. 1013-1031 (December 2001), p. 6. 
 14process in using “soft coordination” measures toward the candidate countries has been 
used in developing the Lisbon agenda and later in transforming it. It will be this indirect 
impact of the EU through policy learning and creation of incentives and also policy 
competition (as in the case of direct taxation) that will increasingly influence further 
development of the state in the new EU members. 
 
Moreover, there were powerful incentives for policy makers in the former 
candidate countries to attach the EU more significance than it actually had in order to 
legitimize their own policies, or due to a poor level of information on the differences 
between EU wide and member states’ policy models. Likewise, different prescriptions of 
the EU received divergent attention and varied in terms of the success of actual 
implementation in the candidate countries. The gap between rhetoric and actual policy 
decisions is also important in understanding and explaining the trajectories of EU 
influence on the changing role of the state in the candidate countries and new members of 
the EU. The following section presents a number of propositions concerning the 
influence of the EU on transition reforms in the Baltic States. 
 
 
Integration and transition: the multifaceted influence of the EU 
 
First, as it could be expected the influence of the EU on shrinking the role of the state is 
most evident in liberalization of external transactions of the Baltic States. The main 
instruments in this field included the agreements on liberalization of trade as well as the 
membership criteria. However, the extent and speed of liberalization has been also 
dependent on the lobbying of domestic interest groups and this trend was actually 
reversed exactly due to the impact of EU membership, i.e. in the case of Estonia (to a 
lower degree in Latvia and Lithuania) the external restrictions to trade actually increased 
after adopting the common external tariffs of the EU.  
 
Second, the EU contributed to the reduced direct participation of the state in the 
economy by encouraging the privatization of state owned enterprises, reduction of price 
regulation and reduction of subsidies. These policy prescriptions followed from the 
regular criticisms included into the Progress Reports produced by the Commission. 
However, the influence of the EU should not be overestimated. The different methods of 
privatization chosen (for example, voucher privatization in Lithuania with no foreign 
participation and privatization open to outsiders in Estonia), divergent speed and shares 
of private (and foreign) capital illustrate the limits of EU influence as regards the form of 
ownership. The EU’s influence increased only during the final stages of large scale 
privatization, but even in this area its influence depended on domestic political economy 
factors (changes in governments, the resistance of interest groups and financial 
constraints). For example, despite the emphasis on privatization of the state owned banks 
in Lithuania which was made explicit by the Commission in it Progress Reports and 
Accession Partnerships (and linked with Phare support), there have been substantial 
delays of several years in completing the process of bank privatization. 
 
 15Third, despite the inclusion of the establishment and protection of property rights 
into the membership criteria and Accession Partnerships, the actual implementation 
process in the Baltic countries has been conducted with substantial delays.
30 For example, 
there has been an explicit linkage with a date of 2000 set by the Commission for the 
completion of the restitution of property rights to the land in Lithuania. However, this 
target date has not been met due to the lack of recourses, political changes in the 
government and failures of institutional coordination. Therefore, it could be stated that in 
the cases where the EU acquis has been missing and the policy prescriptions have been 
based on the general economic membership criteria (“the functioning market economy”), 
the actual influence of the EU of policy reforms and role of the state has been divergent 
and dependent on domestic factors.  
 
Moreover, the need for scarce resources to be given to the implementation of the 
acquis and meeting other internally (for example, restitution of savings in Lithuania) and 
externally set priorities (for example, allocating the share of national budget equaling 2 
percent of GDP from to national defense in order to be ready for NATO membership) has 
actually reduced the capacity of the state to fulfill properly its “guardian” functions. The 
restitution of property rights has been especially impaired due to the shortage of 
resources. The maintenance of internal order and protection of property has also been 
overshadowed by other issues with direct relevance to the accession into the EU and 
presence of well organized interest groups (for example, agricultural policy and 
absorption of EU structural funds). Despite the fact that Justice and Home Affairs chapter 
covered some of these issues, like in most other cases, the focus was on cross-border 
aspects and containment of potential negative spillovers rather than overall enforcement 
of order and property rights (which remains the competence of member states). 
 
Fourth, the EU has increasingly set restrictions on the active role of the state in 
the field of macroeconomic management, although the constraints are becoming more 
evident after accession into the EU and during the preparations to join the EMU. Since 
mid-1990s all three Baltic states have implemented restrictive monetary policies, and 
increasingly restrictive fiscal policies, in particular after the economic crisis in Russia in 
August 1998. The Commission has consistently encouraged the conduct of balanced 
fiscal policies in its regular reports and other documents such as the join assessments of 
medium-term economic policy priorities signed with each Baltic state, although its role 
has been somewhat less direct than, for example, IMF. Importantly, the EU in the form of 
Maastricht criteria (which were not directly applicable for the accession into the EU) 
limited only budgetary deficits and the state debt, but did not say anything about the 
overall size of government expenditures. Likewise, it does not provide strict constraints 
on taxation policy with the exceptions of indirect taxes and recommendation on avoiding 
the “harmful tax competition”. It should be noted, that as a result of aligning VAT and 
excise taxes, the level of indirect taxation has been increasing in the Baltic states. There 
have also been discussions on whether the abolishing of profit tax in Estonia does not 
                                                           
30 It should be noted, that due to the existence of acquis a particular group of property rights – 
copyrights, industrial property rights – are given much more attention than the rights to the productive 
property. Similarly qu            te a lot of attention in the process of legal harmonization is given to other 
post-modern issues such as animal welfare which reflect the preferences of rich Western societies. 
 16contradict the code of conduct of the EU, although finally it was approved by the 
Commission. Overall, the level of direct taxation in the Baltic states (in particular, 
company taxation) has been among the lowest in the EU-25. It seems quite likely that the 
need to catch-up and the competition in the Single market will preserve the trend towards 
lower taxation.  
 
Table 3. The level of direct taxation in the EU-25 member states and candidates 
Social insurance payment, % 
  Income tax  Profit tax   The 
share of 
employee
The share 
of 
employer 
Overall 
level 
Austria 50    25  17.2  25  42.1 
Belgium 50    34  13.1 17.9  31 
Bulgaria  29  19.5  25 17.7 42.7 
Croatia 45  20    n.d n.d  n.d 
Czech Rep.  32   28  12  35  47 
Cyprus  30   15   n.d  n.d  n.d 
Denmark 26.5  30    n.d  n.d  n.d 
Estonia 24  24;   0 (if 
reinvested) 
2 33  35 
Finland 35.5  29    6.1  25.4  31.5 
France  49.6   34.3   15.5  33.9  49.3 
Germany 47  26.4  20  21.3  41.3 
Hungary 38  16  13    33.5  46.5 
Ireland  42   12.5   8  10.8  18.8 
Italy 45.6  34    8.9  30.9  39.8 
Latvia 25    15  9  26.1  35.1 
Lithuania  33   15   3  31  34 
Luxembourg 38.95    22.9  16.4  13.6  30 
Malta  35   35   n.d  n.d  n.d 
Netherlands  52   34.5   39.5  17.2  56.7 
Poland 40    19  27 19.7  46.6 
Portugal  40   30   11  23.8  34.8 
Rumania  16  16  n.d n.d  n.d 
Slovakia 19  19  12.8 38  50.8 
Slovenia  50   25   22.1  15.9  38 
Spain 45  40  4.7  23.6 28.3 
Sveden  60   28   7  25.9  32.9 
 17Turkey  40   30  n.d n.d  n.d 
Great Britain  40   30   11  12.8  23.8 
Greece 40  35  
 
11.6 
 
24.1 
 
35.7 
 
Minimum 
tariff  19 12.5      
Maximum 
tariff  60 40      
ES 25 
average 
(mat.) 
39.53 26.26   
  
ES 15 
average  44.14 29.71     
ES 10 
average  32.6 21.1      
 Source:  www.euractive.com,  http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2002-
2003europe/guide.html,  KPMG, Ernst Young (2003/2004 data) 
 
 
The stabilization policies initiated in the Baltic States during the first half of 
1990s proved successful in bringing down inflation to a level lower than in the EU and 
therefore the political pressure to counteract inflation has been practically absent from in 
the end of 1990s and beginning of 2000s. The public debates about possible surge of 
price increases resumed with the accession into the EU and in particular with the 
anticipation of joining the monetary union. However, it should not prevent the Baltic 
states from joining the eurozone in 2007-2008. It is quite likely that the current monetary 
regimes of the Baltic states will be maintained until accession into the EMU which will 
imply minimal changes. The employment policies have received more attention of policy 
makers in the Baltic States due to the popular salience of this issue and increasing levels 
of unemployment in the second half of 1990s. Interestingly, the Commission has played 
an active role in encouraging to sign the Joint assessment of employment policies with 
the candidate countries in 2002. However, after the accession the levels of unemployment 
started decreasing partly due to a very strong economic growth in all three Baltic 
countries, partly due to the opportunities to work on Ireland, Great Britain and Sweden 
which opened up their labor markets after the enlargement. 
 
Fifth, the accession into the EU has been changing the expenditure patterns in the 
Baltic States. The need to prepare for the use of the EU funds and the actual co-financing 
of them changes the priorities of public investment programs. For example, after the 
accession into the EU the absorption of the structural funds resulted in the increasing 
state investments into the private productive sector. The absorption of the EU funds in 
2005 has become the major factor accounting for the growth of public investments and 
subsidies by 17 percent. The public investments into the transport and rural development 
increased in particular.  
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This poses several questions, namely, the contradictory emphasis on the 
restrictions of state aid stressed during the negotiations on competition policy and a 
current increase in public support to various producer groups in the newly acceded 
countries as a result of use of the EU funds. Moreover, the need for co-financing in 
combination with the investments required to meet EU norms, tax competition in the 
Single market, setting up regulatory infrastructure and lack of reforms in the public 
sectors currently absorbing most budgetary resources (i.e. education, health, social 
security) is creating a stress on fiscal policies and complicating the preservation of fiscal 
balance. In general, these factors are likely to exert an upward pressure on the budgets in 
the Baltic States which could be dealt with by improving tax collection and reforming 
social policies. Interestingly, recent discussions in Lithuania tend to illustrate that the 
need to preserve relatively low fiscal deficits can be used to justify the introduction of 
new taxes. 
 
Sixth, the influence of the EU on the welfare role of the state has been indirect and 
rather contradictory. Although the Commission has stressed the importance of pension 
reform, the EU has little direct influence in this area. This has been one of the reasons for 
the lack of progress in reforming the overall system of social support and such policies as 
health care which have been dominated by well established domestic interest groups. 
Therefore, despite a formal support for the reforms, the need to invest attention and 
financial resources into the fields directly linked with the acquis and focus on structural 
funds had an unintended side effect of neglecting the reforms of social policies. Probably 
the only exception is the agricultural support which has a strong social support dimension 
in the EU and receives enough attention due to its political importance (in particular in 
Latvia and Lithuania). However, the influence of the EU on agricultural policies in the 
Baltics illustrates well the main contradictions between the prescriptions of the EU and 
its own common policy. The policy makers of the candidate countries were caught 
between the need (and encouragements from the Commission) to create conditions for 
restructuring of the agriculture and the generous and highly redistributive model of the 
Common agricultural policy that encourages the freezing of the current farming 
structures. The prospect of gradually but significantly increasing support measures given 
to farmers will later also make the reform of the CAP more difficult (unless the accession 
of Turkey will psuh for more radical reform). 
 
Seventh, the most significant influence of the EU on the role of the state has 
consisted in widening the scope of regulatory activities in the Baltic States. The adoption 
of the acquis governing the internal market and other common policies (in particular, 
environment, labor relations, agriculture, transport and energy) represents a massive re-
regulatory exercise in these countries. This is likely to have several important 
implications for these countries. First, the analyses of the effects of regulatory alignment 
on the economies of candidate countries shows that the main beneficiaries from 
regulatory alignment are the export oriented large companies which trade with the EU.
31 
                                                           
31 See Vilpišauskas, R. The Regulatory Alignment in the Context of EU Accession and its Impact 
on the Functioning of Lithuanian Economy, in Lithuania: Country Economic Memorandum: Volume II: 
Technical Papers, Revenga, A. (ed.) Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2002, p. 205-246. 
 19The main burden of adjustment is likely to fall on small and medium sized enterprises 
operating domestically, in particular in most regulated fields such as agriculture. This is 
likely to create calls for the public measures to soften the adjustment pressure created by 
EU accession, with resulting state activism.  
 
The fast adoption of EU norms is also likely to create potential for over-regulation 
(which has been observed in the Baltic states) with its negative effects on economic 
growth and overload of political agenda with its negative effects on the quality of 
legislation, its implementation and monitoring (though interestingly, according to the 
European Commission scoreboard, after the enlargement Lithuania has joined the best 
performing member states in the EU-25 in terms of implementing Single market acquis 
with Estonia and Latvia lagging quite far behind). The potential for overregulation and 
regulatory capture is higher due to the past legacies, lack of attention to the actual effects 
of regulation and low level of expertise. There have been cases, when domestic interest 
groups have attempted to use newly introduced EU norms to restrict the activities of their 
competitors (the case of pharmaceutical companies and concrete producers in Lithuania).  
 
This illustrates that in some cases the regulatory standards inherited from the past 
have been actually higher (i.e. some health and safety at work norms), or that in some 
cases the regulatory alignment policy has not followed the optimal strategy of extending 
transition periods where the adjustment impact is significant and focusing more resources 
during the immediate perspective to create the regulatory environment necessary to take 
advantage of the internal market, for example, early adoption of the protocol on European 
conformity assessment and mutual recognition of product standards. 
 
In general, the re-regulatory exercise of adopting the EU acquis resembles in some 
respects the process of correcting “market failures” with very limited possibilities for the 
markets to appear. This could be evidenced by the process of de-monopolization of the 
energy sector in Lithuania, where regulation of the future market relations exceeds the 
minimum set by the EU and is likely to prevent the actual competition (in addition to the 
technical limits set by the limited sources of supply). Similar tendencies could be 
observed in the field of telecommunications where the Commission has been pressing to 
introduce the old regulatory framework before replacing it with a new one approved 
before the enlargement in the EU.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper described the main trajectories of the changing role of the state in the Baltic 
States as a result of their accession into the EU. The analysis of the EU’s impact provides 
enough basis to make two concluding observations (one positive, and one normative): (1) 
the process of accession into the EU of the candidate CEECs has resulted in what could 
be described as “weaker guardianship, less direct participation in the economy, status quo 
in welfare promotion and more regulation”; (2) the diffusion of state activities together 
with the past legacies, interest group activities and relatively inefficient public 
administration results in a “widely present and weak” state slowing down the 
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achievement of the main objectives of economic growth and welfare, despite the 
impressive catching-up taking place in the Baltic States since year 2000. 